ch I. The Nature of the regime. The Setting. Seizing power. Flawed decisions. War planning. Saddam's leadership style. Saddam's distorted worldview.
ch. 2. Skewed strategy. Saddam's priorities. Hobbling the Iraqi military. Strategic calculus. Confident of victory. Last-minute diplomatic maneuvering
ch. 3. Military effectiveness. Assessing Iraqi tactical capabilities. Schemes and "bureaucratic eloquence. Irrelevant Guidance. The rise of private armies The Al-Quds. The Fedayeen Saddam. Relatives and sycophants. Security and Command Limitations. Reflections
ch. 4. Crippled operational planning. The operational concept before December 2002. The Operational concept after 18 December 2002
ch. 5. The regime prepares for war. The diplomatic campaign. Countering psychological operations. Logistical preparations for war. War and the oil wells. The Ba'ath Party and its militia. Regular army preparations. Defending Basra. Republican Guard preparations. Final events prior to 19 March
ch. 6. Doomed execution. The Coalition psychological campaign's effects of precision weapons .The air campaign. Regime high value targets. Military targets. The defense of the southern cities and confusion out west. The View at the top. The view of local Ba'athists. The military view. The Ba'ath regime ends with a whimper, not a bang.
OBNB doesn't sell books, but you may be able to find a copy at one of these websites:
The Iraqi perspectives report : Saddam's senior leadership on operation Iraqi freedom from the official U. S. Joint Forces Command report by Kevin M. Woods. ISBN 1591144574. Published by Naval Institute in 2006. Publication and catalogue information, links to buy online and reader comments.
